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here is a reasonably common view, amongst propo-
nents of causal-realist theories of perception, which 
says that objects of immediate perception inhabit a spa-
tial realm that is totally cut-off from the one inhabited 
by material beings.I The reasons for this are two:  
(i) Visual percepts are often described by causal 
realists as ‘colour patches,’ implying that they 
have shapes and sizes, and are extended. Also, non
-visual percepts seem to be positioned; sounds can 
be to the left or to the right, for example. Since any 
being with extension must have a location, it fol-
lows that the objects of our immediate perception 
are spatial entities. 
(ii) Since the causal realist posits that the objects 
of our direct perception to be non-material, it 
would be odd if percepts enjoyed some spatial re-
lation to material things. Is the brown colour-patch 
caused by the table in the same location as the ta-
ble? If so, then why does one directly perceive the 
former but not the latter? Such percepts cannot all 
be in the locations of their material causes since 
some (i.e. hallucinations) have no material causes. 
But if my table-shaped sense-datum is not at the 
table itself, then where is it? Is it swimming behind 
the cornea, or perhaps floating about the brain, 
haunting the synapses? How big is the colour 
patch (in meters squared/cubed?) All of these 
questions, which appear non-sensical, would be 
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legitimate if we were to admit that immaterial per-
cepts inhabit the same space as material beings.  
These considerations say that if causal realism is true, there is 
a ‘phenomenal space’ inhabited by percepts, one which is distinct 
from the space inhabited by material beings. There are dissenters, 
of course: not very long ago, O’Shaughnessy took sense-data to 
inhabit body-relative physical space, that is, the space inhabited 
by material beings.II There are others however, Smythies being to 
my knowledge the most recent example,III who explicitly postu-
late a second space, and it is against the latter sort of causal real-
ist that I shall aim my objections. In what follows, we shall be 
looking at the consequences of the ‘two-space’ view, and arguing 
that such consequences are absurd.  
 
1. Space Oddities  
1.1. Preliminary 
No matter one’s view of the ontology of ‘spaces,’ one can say 
that, where x and y are spatially located entities and where xDy 
reads as ‘x is some distance from y,’ x and y inhabit the same 
space if and only if xDy.IV To define the class of inhabitants of a 
space A  then, one need only identify some inhabitant xA of A , 
and then define the class of A ’s inhabitants as I(A ) =df {y|yDxA}. 
D is an equivalence relation, meaning that I(A) is identical to the 
equivalence class [a]D where a ∈ I(A ). Thus, for any spaces A  and 
B, either I(A) and I(B) are disjoint, or I(A ) = I(B). Since if there 
were some z in both I(A ) and I(B), it would follow that I(A ) = [z]
D = I(B). Therefore, spaces are either completely disjoint, sharing 
no inhabitants, or completely overlapping, sharing all inhabitants. 
There is one other thing which we should prove before mov-
ing on. Call any part of x which possesses a location a spatial part 
of x. What we shall prove is that it is impossible for a being to 
only partially inhabit some space, by which we mean that for any 
being x and space A , either every spatial part of x inhabits A , or 
no spatial part of x inhabits A . This follows from the fact that a 
being must be located at least partially wherever any of its spatial 
parts are, and so will bear the symmetric and transitive D relation 
to each. For example, if x has spatial parts a and b with a inhabit-
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ing A , then we have xDa, so aDx by symmetry, and xDb, from 
which aDb follows by transitivity, so that b also inhabits A . 
 
1.2. Causation 
If material beings are not spatially related to percepts, then the 
space inhabited by material beings (’material space,’ or ‘M’ for 
short) is totally disjoint from the space inhabited by percepts 
(‘phenomenal space,’ or ‘P’ for short). But a causal realist must 
say that the inhabitants of P and M enjoy some sort of causal rela-
tion. But what kind of causal relation could they possibly enjoy? 
Smythies suggests that the causal relations enjoyed by the inhab-
itants of P and M are ‘Humean,’ where a Humean causal relation 
is one of regularity: the Xs are Humean causes of the Y s only if 
there is a constant conjunction of Y s following Xs.V For example, 
Smythies might say that the table is a Humean cause of the brown 
colour-patch since the presence of the table in M is always fol-
lowed by the presence of an appropriately shaped brown colour-
patch in P. But to say that y follows x suggests that the occur-
rence of y comes after the occurrence of x. So if the inhabitants of 
M and P are related by Humean causal relations, then they must 
be temporally related. 
The trouble with saying that inhabitants of P and M are tem-
porally and not spatially related is that this implies that spatiality 
and temporality in the material realm are separable in a way that 
conflicts with the broadly accepted scientific view on the matter 
which says that the two are bound together quite inextricably. 
The physicist will say that it is, strictly speaking, wrong to think 
of material things as entering into spatial and/or temporal rela-
tions, rather they enter into spatiotemporal relations. Further, in 
order for two entities to be a defined spatiotemporal ‘distance’ 
from each other, they must be a defined spatial distance and a de-
fined temporal distance from each other, since the total spatio-
temporal distance will be a function of these values. If the two-
space causal realist wants to take current science seriously, they 
will be pressured to say that the events of P and M cannot tempo-
rally relate. Material beings and sense-data, therefore, must in-
habit disjoint spacetimes. This means that Smythies suggestion of 
Humean causation is something of a non-starter.   
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 As a possible answer, Smythies might suggest something 
like the following: while it may be true that events in P and M 
share no temporal relations, the order of events in P matches up 












Perhaps what makes each relevant event in M the cause of an 
event in P is that each P-event matches up appropriately with 
some M-event in terms of its place in the ordering of the two se-
quences. The first problem with this picture is its symmetry. 
While it is true that the order of events in P appropriately corre-
sponds to the order of events in M, it is also true that the order of 
events in M appropriately corresponds to the order of events in P. 
In other words, this kind of response leaves the causal realist 
without the resources to maintain that the causal relation is from 
M to P, and not the other way around. If this strategy is em-
ployed, could it not be possible that the occurrence of the brown 
patch causes the presence of the table? 
  One might reply by noting that, in isolation, P-events 
seem not to cause one another while M is causally closed. That is 
to say, each event in M is causally determined by other events in 
M. If one is against the idea of systematic overdetermination, this 
will be a good reason to suppose that P-events do not cause M-
events, whereas the regularity that occurs among P-events de-
mands an explanation which cannot be found in P alone. Granted 
that P and M’s events correspond to each other, this gives us rea-
son to suppose that M-events cause P-events in some way or an-
other. 
A desk is present before my eyes 
A window is present before my eyes  
Birds sing in proximity to my ears 
A brown colour-patch appears 
A blue colour-patch appears 
A twittering sound occurs 
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 We should reply by saying that, since the causal relation-
ship between P and M is precisely what is being questioned here, 
our opponent cannot assume to have any knowledge concerning 
the goings-on of M since, according to their own doctrine, we are 
only directly acquainted with the inhabitants of P, and to assume 
that this gives us even an indirect acquaintance with the inhabit-
ants of M begs the question. If there is indeed no causal relation 
between the two, then how can acquaintance with the inhabitants 
of one give us even the vaguest knowledge of what is happening 
in the other? Thus, if the causal realist cannot appeal to any facts 
about what goes on in M, how can they appeal to the causal clo-
sure of M-events? In other words, to appeal to some difference 
between M and P, one must assume that we have knowledge of 
M. But if the causal realist is correct, this could only be the case 
if there really is the very causal connection between M and P 
which is here being called into doubt, and so any appeal to the 
causal-closure of M-events by the causal realist will beg the ques-
tion. 
2. Subjects 
But there is a far more interesting problem for the causal real-
ist: us. When one is presented with the two-space view, a very 
simple question arises. Where are we, the subjects of perception? 
Now the subject cannot be in both P and M, for then it would be 
the case that, where s  the subject, I(M) = [s]D = I(P), which the 
two-space causal realist must deny. Thus, either the subject of 
perception is an inhabitant of P, or of M, or of neither. We now 
turn to consider each of these options. 
 
2.1. Material Subjects 
There are strong reasons to think that we, subjects of percep-
tion, inhabit the space of material things. We think of ourselves 
as sitting on chairs, standing in fields, and so on. If we are not 
mistaken in thinking this, it follows that we inhabit M. For fields 
and chairs are material things, and to be in a field or on a chair, 
one must be spatially related to them. But such a supposition is 
quite odd from the stance of two-space causal realism. If we are 
in M, then why do we perceive the inhabitants of P and not our 
fellow inhabitants of M? If we inhabit M, then to perceive even 
our closest neighbour, we must perform a kind of super-
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perception of an inhabitant of a totally disjoint spatial realm. Per-
sonal incredulity aside, there is an argument to be made. Consid-
er that the primary motivation for causal (or, more generally, in-
direct) realism is the argument from illusion, which goes as fol-
lows: 
1.It appears as though there is some F thing here. 
2.No material thing with which I am now acquainted is in fact 
F. 
3. I must be directly aware of something which is F, else it 
would not appear that way. 
4. Therefore, the F thing of which I am directly aware is a 
non-material entity. 
Where F is some appropriate (i.e. sensory) quality, such as 
colour or shape.  What now becomes clear upon considering this 
argument is that sense-data, being posited to account for the pos-
sibility of illusions, must always actually be as they appear to be 
with respect to sensory qualities, for otherwise we might run an 
argument as follows: 
5. It appears as though some sense-data of mine is F. 
6. But none of my sense-data are in fact F. 
7. I must be directly aware of something which is F, else it 
would not appear that way. 
8. Therefore, the F thing of which I am directly aware is not a 
sense-datum. 
This conclusion contradicts causal realism altogether. Now, as 
we said at the beginning, some sense-data appear to be positioned 
relative to the subject. Auditory sense-data seem to be to the left 
or to the right, for example, and even visual sense-data appear to 
be closer or farther away. If this is the case for every sense-
datum, then since sense-data must always actually be as they ap-
pear to be; sense-data must enjoy spatial relations with the sub-
ject of perception, which is impossible if the subject inhabits ma-
terial space. 
 
2.2. Phenomenal Subjects 
Thus we are driven to consider the alternative, but this view 
is also fraught with difficulties. If the subject inhabits P, then she 
does not inhabit M, for disjoint spatial realms share no inhabit-
ants. But then we, subjects of experience, are not on chairs, in 
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fields, or what have you. Rather, we are in a world of sense-
ghosts, in which there are no material objects like chairs or fields, 
but in which it certainly appears as if there are. If this is the case, 
harking back to our remarks on inter-spacetime causation, the on-
ly promising way we might plausibly be said to interact with ma-
terial beings would be through some kind of order-
correspondence between P-events and M-events. With such a 
shaky ‘causal’ connection, what could possibly account for, 
among other things, the moral responsibility of subjects? Without 
robust, full-blooded causal influence on the world, subjects can-
not be said to fulfill their duties, help or harm other subjects, and 
so on. The basic objection is that we cannot be in phenomenal 
space for we are also agents who act in the material world. 
 Perhaps a causal realist might reply that the acting agent 
and the perceiving subject are distinct beings, and so words like 
‘I’ refer to different beings, depending on whether we are discuss-
ing perception or action. Of course this will not do, since what 
would ‘I’ refer to in the sometimes-true sentence ‘I saw him fall 
over and helped him up’? Did the being that saw the man fall 
over help him up? Surely the answer is yes. Perhaps one could 
reply that ‘I’ refers to two beings, taken together: the perceiving 
subject and the acting agent. But this cannot be right either, for 
the subject and the agent still do not perceive together or act to-
gether; the agent alone acts and the subject alone perceives. Per-
haps ‘I’ could be said to refers to some mereological sum of the 
agent and the subject. But from what we said before (in §1.1) 
there can be no sum of bodies inhabiting disjoint spaces. This line 
of questioning seems to be leading us towards a dead-end. 
 Finally then, if inter-spacetime causation cannot be de-
fended, then is this two-space view, with a phenomenal subject, 
really a causal realism at all? Is this two-space theory not instead 
bound to collapse into idealism? For without a causal relation be-
tween M and P, we subjects have no good reason to inflate our 
ontology by supposing that there is some spacetime, M, utterly 
disjoint from the one we directly perceive, containing things 
called ‘material objects.’ Such a supposition would grossly inflate 
our ontology and so sufficient reasons to accept the existence of 
material things being absent, we would be obligated to reject 
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causal realism entirely and, indeed, collapse into a denial of the 
existence of material. 
 
2.3. Constructed Subjects 
So, given that the subject does not inhabit P and M, and can 
inhabit neither P nor M, we are left with the conclusion that the 
subject inhabits neither. Might the subject inhabit some third 
space? No, for such a view would be subject to the objections of 
both previous sections. The subject would be no distance from 
material objects, and so could not be in fields or on chairs. The 
subject would be no distance from their sense-data, despite it 
looking as if sense-data have subject-relative positions. More 
pressingly for the causal realist, if the subject of perception is in 
neither material nor phenomenal space, then the inhabitants of 
each are of equal status to her. The causal realist then cannot ex-
plain the fact that the subject directly perceives the inhabitants of 
P and not M, for under such a three-space view, there is no other 
connection the subject has to sense-data and not to material be-
ings. 
 Now to my knowledge, no one does think of the subject 
as in some third space, but now we know that the two-spaces 
causal realist has only one alternative left. If the subject of per-
ception is not in any space, then the subject must be in no space 
and must not be a spatial entity. But how might this be true? 
Does the subject not perform perceptive acts at times? Relating 
back to a previous point then, how can a thing inhabit time and 
not space, given that the two are so intimately linked? If we de-
fine a subject of perception as being anything which performs 
perceptive acts, and note that some such acts are performed at 
times, the idea of the subject as a non-spatiotemporal being is 
clearly absurd, and so the causal realist must instead conclude not 
that there is a non-spatial subject of perception, but that there is 
no subject of perception. If there is no subject, is there no percep-
tion either? For if perception occurs where there are perceptive 
acts, and acts are performed by beings, then if a subject of per-
ception is just a being which performs perceptive acts, the occur-
rence of perception entails the existence of subjects of percep-
tion. Thus in order to preserve what one could call the fundamen-
tal axiom of the philosophy of perception, that perception hap-
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pens, the causal realist must devise an entirely different notion of 
perception, one which will not construe perception as consisting 
of acts. Can this be done? 
 We have two spaces, M and P. Well really, we have many 
spaces, since my sense-data are not any distance from yours, and 
so the two also inhabit distinct spaces. So there are as many phe-
nomenal spaces as there are, or as there were thought to be, sub-
jects. Perhaps then we might try to regain the subject as a logical 
construction out of facts about these phenomenal spaces. Let us 
name the phenomenological spaces PS, where ’S’ is at least naive-
ly taken as the name of some subject, and then proceed as fol-
lows: 
Construction 1 
(C1.1) S directly perceives x =df x inhabits PS 
(C1.2) S indirectly perceives x =df x inhabits M, and there 
is some y such that S directly perceives y and yRx. 
 
Where R is some appropriate relation between the relevant inhab-
itants of PS and M. The causal realist can rejoice for she can at 
once say that perception happens and that the truth of such locu-
tions as ’S perceives x’ do not entail that there is any being that 
performs a perceptive act. Now then, we must see what is wrong 
with such a response. First we shall raise some worries with the 
logical construction of the perceiving subject as it has been car-
ried out here. We shall then examine some more general prob-
lems with the attempt to logically construct the subject generally, 
and see whether these problems spell a final defeat for the two-
space view of perception. 
 
3. Constructing Perception 
3.1. Constructive Quibbles 
Before continuing, we must remind ourselves that our objec-
tions relating to inter-spacetime causation, and its apparent im-
possibility (see §1.2), still apply to the logical constructivist posi-
tion. For it is necessary under causal realism that, for it to be true 
that ’S’ indirectly perceives some M-inhabitant, it must be true 
that ’S’ directly perceives some PS-inhabitant which enjoys some 
causal relation with the M-inhabitant. So the relation yRx in 
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(C1.2) must imply some sort of causal relation between x and y. 
While we have already objected to the possibility of such a rela-
tion under two-space causal realism, we will be putting this ob-
jection aside for the time being. I only mention it once more so 
that the reader does not mistake the following nitpicking as an 
implicit approval of the overarching project. 
 Now, consider again Construction 1. The major error with 
this construction is its atemporality. Perception is something 
which can occur at times, but how are we to make sense of ex-
pressions such as “S perceives x at time t” under such a construc-
tion? A straightforward translation of direct perception at a time 
from C1 yields: 
 (C1.1’) S directly perceives x at time t = x inhabits PS at 
             time t. 
But does t refer to some time of M’s, or of PS’s? Since M and PS 
do not share a timeline, as it were, and since events in each are un
-amenable to standard temporal comparison with each other (i.e. 
no PS-event truly precedes or is preceded by any M-event), t can-
not be some time at which both PS-events and M-events occur. 
Now, since direct perception does not explicitly involve M, it is 
acceptable to say that in (C1.1’), t must be some time at which PS
-events occur. But then consider indirect perception, which in-
volves both spaces. A mechanical translation of indirect percep-
tion at a time, from C1.2, yields 
(C1.2’) S indirectly perceives x at time t =df x inhabits M, 
and there is some y such that y inhabits PS and yRx, at 
time t. 
But this cannot do, for t cannot be a time at which M-events and 
PS events both occur since then M and PS would share a timeline. 
So perhaps we can sketch an alternate construction which avoids 
this problem. As a preliminary definition where X is some space, 
we will define an X-time as some time t to which events that take 
place in X bear some temporal relation (i.e. precedence, simulta-
neity, etc.) We shall denote X-times tX, then proceed as follows: 
 
Construction 2 
(C2.1) S directly perceives x at tPs =df x inhabits PS at tPs. 
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(C2.2) S directly perceives x at tM =df x inhabits PS at tPs, 
and tM ∼ tPs. 
(C2.3) S indirectly perceives x at tPs =df  x inhabits M at 
some M-time tM, and there is some y such that S directly 
perceives y at tPs, and yRx, and tM ∼ tPs. 
(C2.4) S indirectly perceives x at tM =df  S indirectly per-
ceives x at tPs, and tM ∼ tPs. 
R is the same as-yet-unanalysed relation from C1, but we also 
introduce a new relation, ∼, which means something like 
‘corresponds to.’ Through the use of this sort of correspondence 
between M-times and PS-times, the causal realist might be able to 
solve the problem of temporal relation between M-events and PS-
events. So, while M-events and PS-events cannot be genuinely 
temporally related, a sort of pseudo-temporal relation might still 
be thought to hold, and to ground the truth of statements such as 
’S indirectly perceived the chair while she directly perceived the 
sense-data caused by the chair.’ The relation ∼ might then be de-
fined in terms of event-ordering (cf. §1.2). So, if sequences of M-
events and PS-events match up in some adequate way, we can say 
that the relevant members of one sequence are pseudo-
simultaneous with those of the other.  More precisely, let p = (p1, 
p2, …, pn) be an n-tuple of PS-events arranged in chronological 
order, and m = (m1, m2, …, mn) be a likewise-arranged n-tuple of 
M-events. Then, if and only if p and m enter into an appropriate 
relation (such as the event sequences in §1.2), one can say that 
each m i is pseudo-simultaneous with each pi, so that the time at 
which m i occurs ‘corresponds to’ the time at which pi occurs. The 
main point of such a definition is that pseudo-simultaneity rela-
tions between events can be grounded by correspondences be-
tween event-sequences. I cannot think of a solid objection to this 
sort of approach, but regardless of whether this particular defini-
tion of pseudo-simultaneity fails, C2 appears to be the right way 
to go for the logical constructivist. For if locutions such as ’S per-
ceives x’ are true at times, which they are, then they must be true 
at both M-times and PS-times, and such can be true universally 
only if these times can enter into some sort of general corre-
spondence with each other.  




3.2. Unconstructed Subjects 
Now, pulling away from particular logical constructions of 
the subject, we shall now be criticising logical constructivism 
about the subject in general. First, we must stress that a logical 
construction is not a being of any sort. For it to be true that x is a 
logical construction, it must mean that there is no such being as x 
and that all true locutions which appear to imply the existence of 
this ‘x’ can be restated in a way that preserves the logical content 
of the locution whilst removing the apparent ontological commit-
ment. In the case of the subject then, to say that the subject of 
perception is a logical construction is first to say that the subject 
does not exist, and second to say that all meaningful locutions 
which appear to imply the existence of the subject are either 
false, or amenable to appropriate paraphrase. I mean to suggest 
here that this is not so for two reasons, the first of which was 
hinted at briefly in §2.2. Certain sentences such as the following 
are true. I saw the chair and went to sit down on it. I heard a loud 
noise and went to see what caused it. In both, the subject of per-
ception is described as performing actions. But a logical con-
struction cannot perform actions. In other words, it is unclear 
how a logical constructivist might deal with any sentence of the 
form 
(α) S perceived x and consequently did φ. 
It is clear that, for the causal realist, this cannot be read in the 
standard way, as synonymous with: 
(α1) S perceived x and consequently, S did φ. 
For ’S’ is not really a being, and so cannot perform actions. In 
other words, (α1) entails that there exists some being which per-
ceived x and did φ, which the constructivist will wish to deny, 
and yet the constructivist ought to allow that locutions such as (α) 
are sometimes true, for they are sometimes true. Perhaps then, the 
logical constructivist could read (α) as synonymous with: 
(α2) S perceived x and consequently, H did φ. 
Where H is some being. So for example, the logical constructivist 
might say that ‘John heard a loud noise and so went to see what 
caused it’ is true if and only if (i) an appropriate aural sense-
datum inhabits PJohn and (ii) some being consequently behaves in 
an appropriate fashion. The problem with such a reading of (α) is 
that it yields an explanatory gap. Why does the perception of x 
result in the consequent performance of φ? The reading (α1) gives 
us a partial explanation, since under this reading the subject is the 
agent, and so the sequence of events is explained by the fact that 
the subject’s perception of x influences that same subject to φ. 
But (α2) leaves us with the question of why the perception of x 
(which is analysed merely as the occurrence of x in the spatially 
disjoint phenomenal realm) influenced any material being’s be-
haviour at all, and specifically why it resulted in H, rather than 
some other being, performing φ. The second reason I have for 
doubting constructivist is that they would make all agents logical-
ly blind. If no subjects of perception are beings, then no beings 
are subjects of perception, and so agents are not subjects of per-
ception. By necessity, they do not see, hear, feel, smell or taste 
anything. This point is similar to the last, but I think that it is 
worth highlighting it in its own right, seeing as it is particularly 
implausible.  
 The final reason I have for dismissing constructivism is 
that, without there being a real subject to act as intermediary, cau-
sation from phenomenal to material spaces is implausibly imme-
diate. On a traditional causal realist picture, we can tell the fol-
lowing sort of story: the presence of the bus before my eyes caus-
es the occurrence of a red colour patch in my phenomenal space. 
My perception of this colour patch then causes me to stand up and 
get on the bus. If we erase the subject from this story, the whole 
thing becomes quite wild. The presence of the bus before agent x 
causes, but does not precede or coincide with, the occurrence of a 
red colour patch in a spacetime utterly disjoint from the spacetime 
inhabited by x and the bus. This occurrence then causes, but does 
not precede or coincide with, x’s standing up and getting onto the 
bus. Again, even if inter-spacetime causation in defensible, the 
complexity of this explanation of events makes it repulsive in ab-
sence of good independent reasons to suppose that it is true. Be-
cause of this, along with my two previous points, I cannot imag-
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So, the positing of a second spatial realm to serve as the 
abode of percepts must be mistaken. Firstly, it seems to make the 
requisite causal relations between material and phenomenal 
events impossible, in the light of our scientific understanding of 
spatiality and temporality. Secondly, the two-space causal realist 
cannot answer the simple question of where we, the subjects of 
perception, fit into their picture. And if the two-space causal real-
ist denies the existence of the subject altogether, she runs into fur-
ther absurdities. In light of these objections I take it as plain that 
the causal realist must take sense-data as being located in material 
space. For my own part, this serves as an enthymeme to the con-
clusion that causal realism tout court is untenable, for one-space 
causal realism (in which sense-data are taken to inhabit material 
space) seems to me even less defensible. My reasons for rejecting 
one-space causal realism go beyond the current scope, though 
they are essentially articulated in the introduction, under point 
(ii). At the very least, I hope that the points made in this paper 
serve to deter would-be two-spacers from assenting to what 
amounts to be an untenable position. 
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